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Legal History for a Dummy 
A COMMENT ON THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Peter Tillers† 
I struggled quite a bit over what I should talk about 
today.  I know a little bit about exploratory fact investigation1 
and about related matters such as induction and what 
philosophers of science call the logic of discovery.2  I thought 
about discussing the worrisome implications of Crawford v. 
Washington3 for constitutional regulation of early phases of 
criminal investigation,4 and I considered talking about the 
possibility that Crawford might further weaken the already 
  
 † Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
 1 See, e.g., Peter Tillers & David Schum, A Theory of Preliminary Fact 
Investigation, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931 (1991). 
 2 Today the notion of a logic of discovery is much discussed.  Karl Popper, 
perhaps inadvertently, deserves credit for first popularizing this notion.  See KARL 
POPPER, LOGIK DER FORSCHUNG (1934) (the word “Forschung” is best translated as 
“research” or “investigation,” but the first English translation of Popper’s book 
rendered the title “The Logic of Scientific Discovery.”  See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (Basic Books, 1959)). 
 3 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 4 Truth-oriented federal constitutional constraints on preliminary phases of 
criminal investigation are already de minimis.  See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 
U.S. 479 (1984) (no due process violation because government failure to preserve 
breath samples in a drunk driving case was not done in bad faith).  It is possible – if 
not inevitable – that the skepticism voiced by the Court in Crawford about the 
possibility of appellate assessment of the trustworthiness of testimonial evidence 
augurs continuing or even heightened reluctance by the Court to require the judiciary 
to police the trustworthiness of police investigation in the name of due process.  Of 
course, Crawford does cast a backward shadow – it does influence pretrial police 
investigation – but the size of that shadow may be rather small because relatively few 
types of pretrial statements may turn out to be “testimonial” for the purposes of a 
Crawfordized, or Friedmanized, Confrontation Clause.  (By speaking of 
Friedmanization, I am referring to Professor Richard Friedman’s substantial role in 
persuading the Supreme Court to revamp its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.)  In 
any event, under any interpretation of Crawford – whether narrow or broad – the 
Confrontation Clause has no application to tangible evidence that does not contain 
symbols deposited by human beings that are designed to communicate information – to 
evidence such as blood, fingerprints, glass fragments, tire tracks, footprints, and 
images recorded by automatic cameras. 
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faint prospect that the Court might use the general due process 
guarantee to scrub criminal investigation of some pathologies 
that John Langbein complains about,5 as well as other 
pathologies that do not seem to worry him nearly as much.6  
But as alluring as this topic is, it has nothing to do with the 
topic under discussion in this symposium.  So I have decided to 
stick to the assigned topic—the role of history in the 
interpretation and elaboration of the Confrontation Clause. 
But my decision not to go off on a tangent dooms me to 
play the role of a Harold Carswell; I have to be a kind of 
academic version of Harold Carswell.  Carswell, you may recall, 
was one of Richard Nixon’s nominees to the Supreme Court.  
You will also recall that Senator Roman Hruska spoke out in 
defense of that unsuccessful nomination and nominee.  Hruska, 
a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Creighton University, said: 
Even if [Carswell] was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges 
and people and lawyers.  They are entitled to a little representation, 
aren’t they, and a little chance? We can’t have all Brandeises and 
Cardozos and Frankfurters and stuff like that there.7 
This, alas, is the role I have to play – the role of a 
Harold G. Carswell – because I know practically nothing about 
legal history, and the little I once knew I have forgotten. 
But what’s the point of having an ignoramus involved in 
this symposium?  Being an ignoramus, I struggled over this 
question.  After due deliberation, I concluded that even an 
ignoramus can contribute to an understanding of the role of 
history in constitutional argument about the Confrontation 
Clause.  How can that be? 
You might think of me as a cheap stand-in for Justice 
Scalia.8  I know what some of you are thinking.  You’re 
thinking, “I know Justice Scalia.  In any event, I know 
  
 5 John Langbein worries most about the degradation of evidence by partisan 
lawyers in an adversary system such as ours.  See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985); see also JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 331-34 (2003). 
 6 John Langbein does not worry nearly as much about unimaginative 
investigation.  But imagination is essential to effective investigation.  See Tillers & 
Schum, supra note 1, at 934; see also Peter Tillers, The Fabrication of Facts in 
Investigation and Adjudication (1998), http://tillers.net/fabrication.html. 
 7 Warren Weaver, Jr., Carswell Attacked and Defended as Senate Opens 
Debate on Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1970, at 21.  But see Bret Stephens, In 
Praise of Mediocrity, JERUSALEM POST, July 16, 2002, at 16B (“Hruska was on to 
something.”). 
 8 Justice Scalia was the author of the Court’s opinion in Crawford. 
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something about you, Tillers, and I know this much: Tillers, 
you’re no Scalia!” 
I confess that I’m no Justice Scalia.  In particular, I 
confess that I can’t begin to match Scalia’s historical learning.  
But this fact just proves my point because even Justice Scalia’s 
formidable historical learning wasn’t good enough! 
The papers presented by Professors Kirst9 and Davies10 
for this conference make a convincing case that Justice Scalia 
got some important parts of his legal history wrong and that 
some of Scalia’s mistakes were elementary from a historian’s 
point of view.11  Although Professors Kirst and Davies agree 
that history was misused in Crawford, the precise moral each 
draws from this differs.12  Professor Kirst’s paper suggests that 
the remedy for the Court’s misuse of history is for the Court to 
avail itself of better historical scholarship – scholarship that 
gives a truer (and broader) picture of the original purpose, or 
intended meaning, of the Confrontation Clause.  Professor 
Davies, by contrast, hints that the appropriate remedy for the 
Court’s abuse of history is for the Court to (largely) abandon 
the use of history (at least for the interpretation of some 
constitutional rules or principles). 
  
 9 Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for 
Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (2005). 
 10 Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know 
It?  Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 11 Professor Davies argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, did 
somewhat better than Justice Scalia, but that Rehnquist’s historical scholarship also 
suffered from grievous flaws.  See Davies, supra note 10, at 113-14.  
 12 Professors Kirst and Davies point to different errors in Justice Scalia’s 
legal history and they draw different lessons from the distinct errors that they identify.  
Professor Davies identifies errors more pertinent to the purposes of my little peroration 
because, although Professor Kirst’s paper makes a very plausible case that the 
Framers saw the Confrontation Clause as a broad – or “political” – ideal, it is 
practically incontestable that Justice Scalia did commit the historical errors that 
Professor Davies identifies and it is hard to avoid Davies’ conclusion that a competent 
legal historian would not have committed the errors that Justice Scalia committed. 
  My comment does not address the question of whether an accurate 
rendition of the historical record or whether reliance on a different swath of human 
history would support the result that the Court reached in Crawford.  My comment 
addresses only the question of the extent to which the Court should rely on its 
understanding of centuries-old legal precedents and practices to fashion and interpret 
constitutional guarantees in the twenty-first century.  For this purpose it is pertinent 
that the historical account that Justice Scalia constructed was demonstrably incorrect. 
  Although I think Justice Scalia got his legal history wrong, it does not 
necessarily follow that I think that Crawford is an unwelcome decision.  This comment 
does not address the more general question of whether Crawford is a good thing.  (My 
answer would be a qualified one; I would say that the answer depends on how 
Crawford is read and on its implications.  See supra note 4.) 
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Professor Kirst’s argument suggests that the 
appropriate remedy for the Court’s shabby historical 
scholarship is better historical scholarship for and on the Court. 
I suspect that this remedy will not work.  The reason for my 
skepticism is that I think there is an important sense in which 
cutting-edge historical scholarship was available to the Court.  
If the Court’s reliance on history was something more than 
mere adhockery and more than a makeweight, the historical 
distortions and mistakes found in Crawford (and in similar 
decisions) occurred not only because the Court didn’t know how 
to do legal history, but also because the Court didn’t know how 
to use legal history.  Crudely put, the problem is that the Court 
couldn’t have recognized good legal history even if it had fallen 
over it. 
It’s time for ignoramus Tillers to make a reappearance.  
If the Scalias of the judicial world can’t get their legal history 
straight, it’s practically certain that the Harold Carswells and 
Peter Tillerses of the world can’t do so either.  Ignoramuses 
(“ignorami”?) like me don’t know how to do good legal history.  
Furthermore, ignoramuses can’t tell the difference between 
good legal history and bad legal history; consequently, they 
don’t know how to sniff out the good historical stuff. 
I don’t mean to suggest that the current Justices of the 
Supreme Court are as ignorant of legal history as I am.  In this 
respect they are surely at least a step or two above the 
Carswells and the Tillerses of the world.  I doubt, however, 
that any of them are much better at their legal history than 
Scalia and Rehnquist.  Indeed, I suspect that in this respect 
some of them are at least a notch or two below Scalia and 
Rehnquist.  If I am right about that, I have to agree with 
Professor Davies:  It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will 
ever get its legal history straight. 
The problem here resembles a problem that arises 
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,13 a decision 
that requires federal trial judges to serve as “gatekeepers” and 
use their own wits to allow good science into federal courtrooms 
and to keep junk science out:  How can you get amateurs to 
make sound professional judgments?  If you can’t do that, how 
do you get amateurs to make sound judgments about the 
credentials and conclusions of professionals? 
  
 13 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 
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There is no easy answer to this puzzle.  The history of 
judicial use of history suggests it is not easy to turn sow’s ears 
into silk purses. 
